I Technical policies and procedures (including encryption, decryption and automatic logoff) for access control on systems that maintain health care records. These systems must allow for unique user identification and include an emergency access procedure for obtaining necessary health care records during an emergency (however, that unique user identification does not need to be a digital signature).
I Transmission security, including: Integrity controls to ensure that electronically transmitted health care records are not improperly modified without detection, and encryption, if and when necessary. Covered entities now must determine how to protect health care records "in a manner commensurate with the associated risk";
Policies and procedures to protect health care records from improper alteration or destruction to ensure data integrity and person or entity authentication, although again, digital signatures are not specifically required. internal company memorandum, closes with an electronic "signature" attesting that the message was authored by "Mike Jacques,"
Sealand's "Rail Reefer Services Coordinator" at the time the e-mail was written. The original email also appears to concern a matter within the scope of Jacques' employment.
The court found that, when the second employee forwarded that e-mail to Lozen, she essentially adopted the statements of the first employee, thus making the entire email stream an admission of a party-opponent, and admissible for any purpose. Essentially, the signature line acted to selfauthenticate the e-mail for purposes of admissibility.
The case of Rio Properties may be one of the first cases in which original service of a summons and complaint was allowed to be accomplished via an e-mail. There, the plaintiff Rio Properties brought a trademark infringement suit against a Costa Rican entity whose only mailing address turned out to be a courier service (which was not
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The trial court authorized to accept service of process) and whose only other address was an e-mail account listed on its website. Thus, there was literally no physical address at which the defendant could be served. American due process principles require that a defendant receive personal service in order for the court to assert jurisdiction. However, with respect to foreign business entities, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(f) (3) permits service "by .. means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court."
Relying on Rule 4(f), Rio sought and obtained an order allowing it to serve a copy of the summons and complaint -which begins the lawsuit and invokes the court's jurisdiction -via e-mail to the defendant's e-mail address, which was e-mail@betrio.com. Although the defendant appeared in the lawsuit, it ultimately had a default judgment entered against it as a result of numerous violations of court orders. On appeal, it claimed the court had no jurisdiction, as it was never properly served. The appellate court acknowledged, 284 F.3d at 101:
[T]hat we tread upon untrodden ground. The parties cite no authority condoning service of process over the Internet or via e-mail, and our own investigation has unearthed no decisions by the United States
Courts of Appeals dealing with service of process by e-mail and only one case anywhere in the federal courts. Despite this dearth of authority, however, we do not labor long in reaching our decision.
Considering the facts presented by this case, we conclude not only that service by e-mail was proper -that is, reasonably calculated to apprise RII of the pendency of the action and afford it an opportunity to respond -but in this case, it was the method of service most likely to reach RII.
The court was particularly persuaded by the evidence that the defendant seemed to have structured its business dealings such that it could only be contacted via its e-mail address. Nonetheless, the court also issued a warning that such e-mail service is to be the exception, not the rule, and pointed out some of the problems inherent in such service, in which electronic signatures (or the lack thereof) loomed large, 284 F.3d
at 1019:
Despite our endorsement of service of process by e-mail in this case, we are cognizant of its limitations. In most instances, there is no way to confirm receipt of an e-mail message. Limited use of electronic signatures could present problems in complying with the verification requirements of Rule 4(a) and Rule 11, both of which require an attorney's signature on original pleadings, and system compatibility problems may lead to controversies over whether an exhibit or attachment was actually received. Accordingly, we leave it to the discretion of the district court to balance limitations of e-mail service against its benefits in any particular case.
Having found that service was properly effected, the court quickly disposed of the defendant's jurisdictional and other substantive issues.
As discussed above, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington believes it has adequately addressed the Ninth Circuit's concerns regarding the verification requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nonetheless, it is ironic that the courts, which were explicitly exempted from ESIGN, have moved further towards the goal of purely paperless transactions than many of the industries that originally clamored for ESIGN's enactment. Once again, the law of unintended consequences prevails. I
